An axiomatic analysis of the concept of unequal exchange (UE) between countries is developed in a dynamic general equilibrium model that generalises Roemer's [22] economy with a global capital market. The class of UE definitions that satisfy three fundamental propertiesincluding a correspondence between wealth, class and UE exploitation status -is completely characterised. It is shown that this class is nonempty and a definition of UE exploitation between countries is proposed, which is theoretically robust and firmly anchored to empirically observable data. The full class and UE exploitation structure of the international economy is derived in equilibrium. JEL classification: D63; F02; B51.
Introduction
Egalitarians -and more specifically, socialists -have long questioned the structure of international relations, pointing in particular at the large inequalities in income and standard of living among countries. An influential analysis within this tradition has been developed by the so-called dependence school, according to which such inequalities are the product of exploitative relations between rich and poor nations. 1 In his classic work, for example, Emmanuel [9] has argued that the core-periphery structure of international relations generates an unequal exchange (UE) between rich and poor nations. According to Emmanuel, given institutionalised wage differentials between developed and less developed nations, capital mobility across borders and the international trade of commodities cause a transfer of surplus labour from poor nations with low capital-labour ratios to wealthy nations with high capital-labour ratios, which results in the impoverishment of the former to the advantage of the latter. UE theory has generated substantial controversy on both empirical and theoretical grounds.
Empirically, some studies emphasise the positive effects of international exchanges and provide evidence suggesting that the "movement toward free trade may actually have just the opposite effect [than predicted by UE theory], leading to a reduction in income disparity among countries" (Ben-David [4] , p.653). UE theory is deemed theoretically doubtful, because it is based on the comparison between the amounts of labour embodied in the goods traded, and the notion of labour embodied is widely considered to be metaphysical andat best -of very limited validity, as it can only be defined in rather special cases. 2 In this paper, we examine the theoretical foundations of UE theory in order to determine whether a general, consistent, and empirically grounded definition of UE can be identified. 3 The starting point of our investigation is a seminal contribution by Roemer [22] , which provides an elegant analysis of UE between countries, in a static model with revenuemaximising countries and a Leontief technology (see also Roemer [21] ). Roemer [22] departs from the standard UE approach in two key respects. First, he adopts a rigorous definition of UE exploitation that is unrelated to the labour theory of value and that does not presume global markets to be non-competitive. Second, in order to analyse the normative foundations of UE theory, he focuses on a model in which "all differences between countries [are eliminated] save one: the capital-labor ratio" (Roemer [22] , p.35). This allows him to show that class relations and UE exploitation emerge in the international economy, even assuming perfectly competitive global commodity and credit markets, and even if all countries have access to the same technology and share the same preferences. In equilibrium, the global economy is characterised both by mutual gains from trade and by asymmetric international relations because the economic development of less developed countries is crucially dependent on capital exports from developed countries, and surplus is transferred from the former to the latter via international capital markets. "Unequal exchange does not preempt mutual gains from trade" (ibid.). 4 Major heterogeneities in institutions, technology or preferences and market imperfections are unessential for these results: unequal and asymmetric relations between countries "can be entirely explained by differential capital-labor ratios across countries" (Roemer [22] , p.34).
As insightful as Roemer's [21, 22] contributions are, it is still an open question whether his key insights are robust. It is not clear, for example, whether Roemer's conclusions hold under more general assumptions concerning preferences and technology, and outside of static models. In later contributions, Roemer himself has raised doubts on the generality of UE theory, 5 and on the possibility of identifying a rigorous definition that captures the fundamental normative intuitions of UE exploitation.
In this paper, we investigate the robustness of UE theory and extend Roemer's [21, 22] analysis by adopting a more general formal framework and a different methodological approach. Formally, instead of restricting attention to static, one-period economies, we set up a dynamic general equilibrium model of the global economy in which intertemporal decisions are explicitly considered and the concept of UE exploitation is analysed at general dynamic equilibria. Further, the model incorporates more general assumptions on preferences -by assuming that countries' welfare depends both on consumption and on leisure -and on technology -by allowing for convex production sets.
Methodologically, instead of focusing on a specific definition of UE exploitation, we adopt the axiomatic approach pioneered by Yoshihara and Veneziani [33] and significantly extend it by considering different properties, and by requiring our axioms to hold at general dynamic equilibria. We examine three fundamental properties. The first one, called Labour Exploitation (LE), is a domain axiom that captures some basic intuitions defining the core of UE theory that all admissible definitions should satisfy. It is a dynamic generalisation of similar properties formulated in the literature (see, e.g., [31, 29, 30] ), and it reduces to the latter in the special case of a static, one-period economy. Intuitively, according to LE, exploitative international relations are characterised by systematic differences between the labour performed by agents in a country and the amount of labour 'contained' in some reference commodity bundles that capture their consumption possibilities. 6 The other two properties, called the Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle (CECP) and the Wealth-Exploitation Correspondence Principle (WECP) capture axiomatically two intuitions of UE theory originally introduced by Roemer [21, 22] , who proved them to hold in certain economies, under specific UE definitions. According to CECP, a correspondence should exist between a country's position in the global capital market and its exploitation status: in equilibrium, nations that optimise by lending capital abroad should emerge as UE exploiters, whereas nations that optimise by borrowing capital should be UE exploited.
CECP has been first formulated axiomatically by Yoshihara [31] in a static context; we extend it here to hold at general dynamic equilibria. WECP is a novel axiom in the literature: it states that the exploitation status of countries in the international arena should be determined by their level of development (proxied by the value of their productive endowments).
We completely characterise the class of UE definitions that satisfy all three axioms at the general dynamic equilibria of the international economy. Then, we prove that this class is nonempty: a definition recently proposed by Yoshihara and Veneziani [31, 33, 29] based on the 'New Interpretation' (Duménil [6, 7] ; Foley [12] ; Duménil et al [8] ) satisfies all three properties. Contrary to the received view, a rigorous and logically consistent definition of unequal, exploitative exchange exists, which is firmly anchored to empirically observable data and extends the key insights of UE theory to general, dynamic international economies.
Our analysis here continues a research programme in axiomatic exploitation theory started in Yoshihara and Veneziani [33] (see also [31, 29, 30] ) and significantly extends it to the dynamic context, and to deal with different intuitions of UE theory, formalised in a different set of axioms. We analyse general intertemporal economies because this allows us to evaluate the robustness of Roemer's [21, 22] key insights, and the generality of the 'New Interpretation', but also because they raise some important conceptual and formal issues in axiomatic UE theory. In fact, as shown below, in a dynamic context, the appropriate definition of UE exploitation depends on the normative relevance of agents' consumption and savings decisions, and this requires a number of adjustments in the conceptual framework, in the axiomatic system, and in the formal arguments.
To be sure, this paper does not fully answer the question of the normative relevance of UE and the wrongfulness of exploitative international relations. Yet the rigorous, axiomatic characterisation of a nonempty class of definitions that preserve some key insights of UE theory is a crucial first step in order to address that question. 7 
The Model
The economy consists of a set N = {1, ..., N } of countries, with generic element ν, in which a sequence of nonoverlapping generations exist, each living for T periods, 8 and indexed by the 7 We discuss some normative implications of UE exploitation theory in Veneziani [27, 28] and Yoshihara and Veneziani [33] . 8 We specify the framework in the case with a finite T in order to highlight the similarity with Roemer's [21, 22] economies. However, the notation and definitions can be extended in a straightforward way to the case with one infinitely-lived generation, and all of our results hold both if T is finite and if it is infinite. date of birth kT , k = 0, 1, 2, ... In every period t, countries consume n produced commodities, and leisure. Technology is freely available to all countries: in every t, capitalists in each country can operate any activity in the production set P ⊆ R 2n+1 , with generic element α = (−α l , −α, α), where α l ∈ R + is the direct labour input; α ∈ R n + are the inputs of the n goods; and α ∈ R n + are the outputs of the n goods. The net output vector arising from α is denoted as α ≡ α − α. Let 0 be the null vector. The set P is assumed to be a closed convex cone containing the origin in R 2n+1 , and to satisfy the following standard properties. 9
Assumption 1 (A1). For all α ∈ P , if α ≥ 0 then α l > 0 and α ≥ 0.
Assumption 2 (A2). For all c ∈ R n + , there exists α ∈ P such that α c.
Assumption 3 (A3). For all α ∈ P , and for all
A1 implies that labour and some capital are indispensable to produce any output; A2 states that any non-negative commodity bundle is producible as net output; A3 is a standard free disposal condition. The set of efficient production activities is ∂P = {α ∈ P | α ∈ P such that α > α}.
Commodities and capital can freely migrate across borders, while labour is immobile. In every t, (p t , r t ) is the 1 × (n + 1) international price vector, where p t denotes the prices of the n commodities and r t is the interest rate that prevails in competitive capital markets. In order to focus on international inequalities, agents are assumed to be identical within each country; thus, the superscript ν denotes both a country and its representative agent.
Following Roemer [21, 22] , we explicitly model the time structure of exchange and production. Each production period t is divided into two stages: the capital market and the market for productive assets operate at the beginning of t, where goods are exchanged at the prices p t−1 ruling at the end of t − 1/beginning of t. At the beginning of t, ω ν t is the vector of productive assets owned by ν, -where ω ν kT denotes the endowments inherited when born in kT , -and the market value of ν's endowments, ν's wealth, is
At the beginning of every t, each ν ∈ N can borrow an amount p t−1 β ν t on the international credit market to purchase β ν t in order to operate production activity β ν t = −β ν lt , −β ν t , β ν t ∈ P . Otherwise, it can use its wealth W ν t either to purchase capital goods α ν t to operate activity
or to buy commodities δ ν t ∈ R n + to be stored and sold at the end of the period; or to lend capital z ν t ∈ R + abroad.
Because production takes time, output is exchanged on the final goods market at the end of t, at end-of-period prices p t . For each country ν ∈ N , proceedings from production are given by p t α ν t + β ν t and the return to lending z ν t is (1 + r t ) z ν t , thus gross national income
The rest of ν's income can be used to purchase consumption goods c ν t ∈ R n + and to finance accumulation ω ν t+1 ∈ R n + .
Given production decisions (α ν t , β ν t ), in every t, the total amount of labour performed by agents in ν ∈ N is given by Λ ν t = α ν lt + β ν lt and it cannot exceed the labour endowment, L,
which is assumed to be the same for all countries without loss of generality. Therefore for each ν ∈ N , leisure enjoyed at t is l ν t = L − Λ ν t , and we assume that country ν's welfare at t can be represented by a function u : R n + × [0, L] → R + : u(c t , l t ) can be interpreted either as a standard utility function or as an objectivist index of well-being. 10 In order to characterise the structure of international relations and the dynamic pattern of exploitation and classes, it is necessary to impose some structure on the function u. We
where v : R n + → R and φ : [0, L] → R are strictly increasing and twice differentiable. Further, in order to avoid a number of unnecessary technicalities, we assume that v is strictly quasi-concave and homogeneous of degree one, while φ is strictly concave with lim l→L φ (l) = 0 and lim l→0 φ (l) = ∞.
These assumptions significantly generalise the canonical models of exploitation theory by Roemer [21, 22] . They are appropriate from a normative perspective (see, for example, Silvestre [25] ), and standard in international economics -and specifically, in the literature on
Heckscher-Ohlin models (see, for example, Chen [5] ). The assumptions on φ, for example, rule out implausible equilibria with countries performing zero labour, or enjoying no leisure at all. It is worth stressing, however, that the restrictions on u are imposed mostly for technical convenience, and the main results of this paper can be derived under more general assumptions, albeit at the cost of a significant increase in technicalities. 11
be ν's lifetime consumption plan; and likewise for α ν , β ν , z ν , δ ν , and Λ ν , and let
be the path of international price vectors during the lifetime of a generation. Let ξ ν = (α ν , β ν , z ν , δ ν , c ν , ω ν ) denote a generic intertemporal plan for ν. Let 0 < ρ 1 be the time preference factor. Each ν is assumed to choose ξ ν to maximise welfare subject to the constraint that in every t, (1) gross national income is sufficient for consumption and accumulation; (2) wealth is sufficient for production and lending; (3) production activities are technologically feasible. Finally, (4) we follow Roemer [21, 22] and assume that each agent optimises subject to the requirement that he does "not run down the value of his assets, which is the reproducibility requirement" (Roemer [21] , p.63). Unlike in Roemer's static economies, however, the reproducibility condition (4) does not hold in every period.
In any given t, agents can use their wealth to finance consumption but every generation k is constrained to bequeath at the end of its life at least as much wealth as they inherited.
Formally, given (p, r), each ν solves programme M P ν . 12
subject to: for every t = kT , . . . ,(k + 1) T − 1,
M P ν is a suitable way of modelling country ν's decision problem, given the representativeagent assumption, and it generalises Roemer's [21, 22] static models in which countries maximise national income.
In order to capture the role of financial markets in exploitative international relations, only short-term credit contracts are considered as in Roemer [21, 22] : within each period, countries can operate on the international capital market to finance their production plans, but contracts do not extend over time and credit plays a limited role in fostering accumulation. Consumption, debt, and savings must be financed out of current revenue. Due to the possibility of saving, and noting that net savings are allowed to be negative, however, Roemer's [21, 22] static models are generalised by allowing for intertemporal trade-offs within a country, consistently with a dynamic setting in which agents live for more than one period.
For all ν ∈ N , let O ν (p, r) be the set of vectors ξ ν that solve M P ν at prices (p, r).
Let
, or as a shorthand notation E(Ω kT ), denote the international economy with technology P , countries N , welfare function u with discount factor ρ, and productive endowments Ω kT . Let c t = ν∈N c ν t ; and likewise for all other variables. For the sake of simplicity, let "for all t" stand for "for all t = kT, . . . , (k +1)T −1".
Following Roemer [21, 22] , the equilibrium concept can now be defined. 13 Definition 1: A reproducible solution (RS) for E(Ω kT ) is a price vector (p, r) and an associated profile of actions (ξ ν ) ν∈N such that:
In other words, at a RS, (i) every country optimises. Conditions (ii) and (iii) are standard excess demand conditions: in the markets for final goods and capital goods, respectively, aggregate demand should not exceed aggregate supply in any period. Condition (ii) also 13 The existence of a reproducible solution is proved in the Addendum.
requires the RS to be non-trivial in that some production takes place in every period. Condition (iv) requires that the international credit market clears in every period. Finally, the reproducibility condition (v) is a generalisation of analogous equilibrium conditions imposed by Roemer [20, 21, 22] : it requires that every generation leaves to the following at least as many resources as they inherited. As Roemer ([20] , p.507) has argued, the notion of reproducibility is one of the distinctive features of the concept of equilibrium in the formal literature on exploitation theory (compared to a more standard concept of general equilibrium). It is also a standard condition in Ramsey-type growth models with a finite horizon (see, e.g., Morishima's [16] classic model) and it is quite natural given that countries -rather than individuals -are the focus of analysis. For, although each generation dies, the country itself lives on, and so its capital stock should not be depleted.
In the rest of this section, we derive some preliminary results that describe the characteristics of the equilibria of the international economy. First, the strict monotonicity of v implies that at any RS, it must be p t > 0 for all t. Next, given (p, r), at any t, let Hence, if (p, r) , (ξ ν ) ν∈N is a RS for E(Ω kT ), then it is also a RS for E(Ω (k+1)T ), and in what follows generation k = 0 can be considered without loss of generality.
A subset of equilibria of particular interest are those where agents optimise at an interior solution. Thus:
is an interior solution to M P ν with c ν t > 0 for all t.
The next result proves a necessary condition for an IRS. 
, for all t.
Proof: 1. By Proposition 1, for all ν ∈ N , at the solution to M P ν , it must be (1
Then it is immediate to prove that, at an interior so-lution ξ ν ∈ O ν (p, r) to M P ν , for all t and all ν ∈ N , it must be
for all i, j. By the linear homogeneity of v(.), this implies that at an interior solution to M P ν , at all t, it must be
The first part of the statement then follows from the strict concavity of φ.
At any
p jt , for all i, j. Then by step 1, at an IRS, it must be c * ν
ptc * t > 0, at all t and for all ν ∈ N . Take any two adjacent periods t,t + 1, and consider ν ∈ N such that
for all i and all ν ∈ N . By the
Using the latter expression, the change in welfare can be written equivalently as −
. Therefore a necessary condition for ξ ν ∈ O ν (p, r) to be an in-
which holds only if the expression in brackets is equal to zero.
The International Class Structure
In this section, we derive the international class structure, where "classes of countries can be defined with reference to the use of the credit market" (Roemer [22] , p.54). Let (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ) be a vector where a i ∈ {+, 0}, i = 1, 3, a 2 ∈ {+, 0}, and "+" means a non-zero vector in the appropriate place. We extend Roemer's definition of classes within each period t. such that 1 + r t > max i p it p it−1 for all t. Then at all t:
Proof: 1. By Lemma 2, at an IRS, Λ ν t = Λ * t = α ν lt + β ν lt > 0, all ν ∈ N .
2. By step 1, it immediately follows that at any t, ν ∈ C 4 t if and only if W ν t = 0.
Consider part (ii). Suppose p
We show that Γ ν t has a solution of the form (+, 0, 0). By step 1, and noting that 1 + r t > 0, at an IRS it must be w max
by the convexity of P , it follows that there exists
4. Parts (i) and (iii) are proved similarly.
In order to clarify the normative relevance of Theorem 1, note that country ν's wealth, 
Exploitative International Relations
Exploitation in international relations is conceived of as the unequal exchange of labour between countries as in Roemer [21, 22] : exploitative international relations are characterised by systematic differences between the labour 'contributed' by agents in country ν and the labour 'received' by them via their national income. As intuitive as this definition may seem, in general economies the notions of labour 'contributed' and labour 'received' are not obvious. Indeed, the very existence of a general, consistent definition which preserves the key insights of UE theory has been put into doubt. In this section, we develop an axiomatic analysis of UE exploitation and characterise a class of definitions that satisfy three important properties. In the next section, we prove that the class is nonempty.
A domain axiom
In economies with homogeneous labour, the labour 'contributed' by ν coincides with the labour performed by workers in ν, Λ ν t . 15 Outside of static, two-class Leontief economies with subsistence wages, instead, many different definitions of the labour 'received' by ν can be, and have in fact been proposed, which incorporate different normative and positive views. 16 In recent work, Yoshihara and Veneziani [33, 31, 30, 29] have proposed an axiom that identifies the domain of admissible UE definitions: it imposes some weak restrictions on the notion of labour received and all of the main approaches satisfy it in static economies.
In this subsection, we generalise it to the dynamic context.
At the most general level, in UE theory, the amount of labour 'received' by agent ν is determined with reference to some bundles that belong to a normatively relevant budget set and capture ν's consumption opportunities. In static models, all of the main UE approaches usually (albeit sometimes implicitly) assume that in equilibrium agents at least replace any wealth used up in production in every period and stipulate that the reference bundles are, or can be purchased with agents' actual net incomes at all t. In the general dynamic framework considered here, the relevant notion of agents' net income is not obvious and the choice of the appropriate budget set is not unambiguous.
Let (p, r) , (ξ ν ) ν∈N be a RS for E(Ω 0 ). The gross income of each ν ∈ N at t is given
In order to identify ν's 'net' income at t in this context, the fund for replenishing ν's wealth p t−1 ω ν t in the next period should be deducted after adjusting for the difference in prices between t − 1 and t. To do so, we define the inflation index at t, R t ≡ ptωt p t−1 ωt , taking ω t as the inflation basket. Given this index, ν's wealth p t−1 ω ν t at value of W ν t to the next period. 17 The reason for this choice is threefold. First, countries are interested in wealth, rather than in a specific vector of capital endowments. Second, from a normative perspective, for a given gross income, in every t exploitation status should not depend on specific saving and investment decisions, or on the specific vector of productive endowments purchased. According to Roemer ([22] , p.53), for example, the appropriate notion of UE exploitation should be preference-independent. Third, it is immediate to show that the focus on bundles in B t ((p, r) ; p t−1 ω ν t , Λ ν t ) is a generalisation of the standard approach and it reduces to the latter at a RS with stationary prices and capital.
Let E denote the set of all economies E(P, N , u, ρ, Ω 0 ) that satisfy our assumptions on technology, agents, preferences and endowments. For all c ∈ R n + , let ψ (c) ≡ {α ∈ P | α ≥ c} be the set of production activities that can produce c as a portion of output. Given any definition of exploitation, let N ter t ⊆ N and N ted t ⊆ N denote, respectively, the set of exploiters at t, or W P t exploiters, and the set of exploited agents at t, or W P t exploited agents, at a given allocation. Our domain axiom can now be formally introduced. To be specific, by LE under any admissible definition, in equilibrium the sets N ter t ,
belief true" (Roemer [21] , p.152). In this subsection, we state this intuition axiomatically and formalise two properties that incorporate the relation between wealth, class, and exploitation status. Then, we provide a characterisation of the class of definitions of UE exploitation that satisfy LE and both properties, in the dynamic international economies considered here.
The first property captures the intuition that richer countries are UE exploiters while less developed countries suffer from UE exploitation:
Wealth-Exploitation Correspondence Principle (WECP): Let (p, r) , (ξ ν ) ν∈N be an
with W t W t such that for any E(P, N , u, ρ, Ω 0 ) ∈ E with ν∈N ω ν 0 = ν∈N ω ν 0 and any
WECP states that, in equilibrium, in any given period there should be two (possibly equal) threshold wealth levels, W t , W t , such that the set of W P t exploiters (resp., W P t exploited) corresponds to the set of countries with wealth higher than W t (resp., lower than W t ). The threshold levels may depend on equilibrium prices and aggregate endowments, but not on the equilibrium wealth distribution.
The next Lemma characterises the set of definitions that satisfy WECP.
Lemma 4 (WECP): Let (p, r) , (ξ ν ) ν∈N be an IRS for E(P, N , u, ρ, Ω 0 ) such that 1 + r t − R t > 0 for all t. Given any definition of UE exploitation satisfying LE, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) WECP holds;
(ii) at all t, there exist W t , W t > 0 with W t W t such that for any E(P, N , u, ρ, Ω 0 ) ∈ E with ν∈N ω ν 0 = ν∈N ω ν 0 and any IRS (p, r) , (ξ ν ) ν∈N for E(P, N , u, ρ, Ω 0 ) with ν∈N ω ν 3. ((i)⇒(ii)) Let WECP and CECP hold. By Lemma 4, it is sufficient to show that at all t, W t p t−1 α max t and p t−1 α min
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that W t > p t−1 α max t , some t. We consider two cases.
Case 1: suppose that p t−1 α max t p t−1 ω ν t , all ν ∈ N , for any E(P, N , u, ρ, Ω 0 ) ∈ E with ν∈N ω ν 0 = ν∈N ω ν 0 and any IRS (p, r) , (ξ ν ) ν∈N for E(P, N , u, ρ, Ω 0 ) with ν∈N ω ν t = ν∈N ω ν t , all t. By Theorem 1,
But then, noting that the same holds for any W t p t−1 α max t and that WECP does not require wealth thresholds to be unique, it is possible to set W t = p t−1 α max t Case 2: suppose that there exists an economy E(P, N , u, ρ,
then the desired contradiction follows from Theorem 1, CECP, and WECP. So, sup- It is worth stressing at this point the generality of our results, which are derived in intertemporal economies, under rather general assumptions on preferences and technology, and without restricting the analysis to steady states. Perhaps more importantly, they are derived without adopting any specific UE approach: they hold for every definition within the admissible domain identified by LE. The relation between wealth, class and exploitation is thus proved to hold for an entire (and potentially large) class of UE definitions.
A Definition of UE Exploitation
Section 4 provides a complete characterisation of the class of UE definitions that satisfy LE, WECP and CECP. But are there any definitions that actually meet the conditions in Theorem 2? This is not an idle question. Yoshihara [31] has shown that in static economies with revenue-maximising agents, some of the received definitions -including Morishima's [17] and Roemer's [21] -satisfy LE but not CECP. Roemer [21, 23] himself has raised doubts on the robustness of the relation between wealth, exploitation, and class. In this section, we show that the class of definitions identified by Theorem 2 is nonempty. To this end, we introduce a dynamic generalisation of a definition recently proposed by Yoshihara and
Veneziani [33, 31, 29] and show that it satisfies LE and preserves WECP and CECP, in the international economies considered in this paper.
Let (p, r) , (ξ ν ) ν∈N be a RS for E(Ω 0 ) and let α p,r t + β p,r Definition 4 generalises the definition proposed by Yoshihara and Veneziani [33, 31, 29] in a static context. In static economies, exploitation status is measured with reference to consumption bundles that agents can purchase with their actual net income. As argued in section 4.1 above, however, in the general dynamic framework considered here, actual net income is not necessarily a normatively appropriate variable to determine agents' exploitation status and we propose to focus instead on the net income that could be devoted to consumption if an agent decided only to replace its wealth.
Definition 4 is conceptually related to the 'New Interpretation' (Duménil [6, 7] ; Foley [12] ;
Duménil et al [8] ). In fact, τ c ν t is ν's reference share of world income, and so τ c ν t (α p,r lt + β p,r lt ) is the share of total social labour that ν receives by earning national income p t c ν t . countries in the credit market and with unequal flows of revenue and labour.
Conclusion
This paper develops an axiomatic analysis of the concept of unequal exchange between countries in a dynamic general equilibrium model, which generalises Roemer's [21, 22] economy with a global capital market. The class of definitions that preserve three fundamental properties of UE exploitation theory -including the existence of a correspondence between wealth, class and exploitation status, -in general dynamic equilibria is completely characterised. This class is shown to be nonempty: there exists a UE definition that satisfies a basic domain axiom and both the Wealth-Exploitation Correspondence Principle and the Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle. This definition is conceptually related to the so-called 'New Interpretation' (Duménil [6, 7] ; Foley [12] ; Duménil et al [8] ). It is logically consistent, general, and firmly anchored to empirically observed data.
Based on this definition, unequal international relations are fully characterised and Roemer's [21, 22] It may be objected that in reality capital flows do not move in the direction predicted in Theorem 1: as Lucas [14] famously argued, capital does not flow to underdeveloped countries.
Two points should be made here that suggest that the so-called "Lucas paradox" does not pose a major challenge to our conclusions. Firstly, there is a growing empirical literature suggesting that there may be no paradox after all: the actual pattern of credit flows may be explained by some fundamental violations of the basic assumptions of the neoclassical model which are also shared by Roemer's [21, 22] model and our extension of it, such as differences in fundamentals, including institutional quality (Alfaro et al [1] ), and in credit risk (Reinhart and Rogoff [18] ). Actually, Reinhardt et al ( [19] , pp.235-6) have shown that "the prediction of the standard neoclassical theory holds only when taking into account the degree of capital account openness, conditional on a set of fundamentals. Among countries with an open capital account, richer countries tend to experience net capital outflows, while poorer countries tend to experience net capital inflows. In contrast, in countries with closed capital account, there appears to be no systematic relationship between the level of economic development and net capital flows." According to them, the phenomenon observed by Lucas [14] is due to the relatively high degree of capital controls in the period he considered.
The paradox, however, disappeared in the 1990s when capital controls were lifted and "this liberalization process was associated with significant changes in the patterns of capital flows across countries at different income levels" (Reinhardt et al [19] , p.236). 21 Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, ours is not an investigation of the determinants of the size and direction of capital flows in the current global economy. This paper develops a normative, axiomatic analysis of the concept of exploitation and for this purpose we have followed Roemer ([22] , p.58) in using Occam's razor and abstracting from "many elements of friction or noncompetitiveness or 'imperfections'". These simplifying assumptions are theoretically appropriate from a normative perspective, as they allow us to derive precise conclusions on the concept of UE in an abstract and general, but at the same time well-defined context, focusing on a benchmark competitive economy. Our main axioms are thus restricted to hold at the competitive equilibria of the intertemporal economy with unrestricted capital flows and no labour mobility -the "classical [UE] environment" (Roemer [22] , p.53). The appropriate extension of our axiomatic analysis to noncompetitive settings and disequilibrium allocations is an interesting and open question.
Our analysis thus provides a normative benchmark to evaluate international relations under globalisation. For, inequalities in wealth and development among countries are at least partly due to past "robbery and plunder" -especially during the colonial period - 21 One may argue that such movements are still smaller than predicted by the standard neoclassical model based on international differences in the marginal product of capital. As Lucas ([14] , p.92) put it, "one would expect no investment to occur in the wealthy countries in the face of return differentials of this magnitude." This issue is not really relevant in our framework, especially given that, as noted in section 3, international capital flows are not determined by differences in the marginal productivity of capital.
which makes them, and the unequal exchanges and exploitative relations resulting from them hardly justifiable, as argued by Ferguson and Veneziani [10] . To be sure, the radical change in ownership relations in the world economy necessary to eliminate UE exploitation may be considered politically infeasible. This does not make the concept of UE exploitation any less relevant. For it is essential to establish a robust normative benchmark against which to evaluate international relations, and even if it is not possible to eliminate UE exploitation in one stroke, there may be a number of measures to reduce it via international transfers and redistribution. An interesting question from this perspective concerns the development of a measure of the degree or intensity of UE exploitation of each country, and an index of aggregate UE exploitation in the international economy that goes beyond the rather coarse classification into UE exploiting and UE exploited nations. We leave this issue for further research.
